The geopolitical race for the EV battery

India imports around 90% of its battery cells today. A 2026 study estimates when that dependence could reverse and what stands in the way.
1. Case study: India
Why the battery is the key component
Electrifying transport is one of the pillars of India's strategy to reach net zero. The Indian Government has set very ambitious targets for 2030: 30% of private cars, 70% of commercial vehicles and 80% of two- and three-wheelers should be electric. The market is following: according to the authors, electric vehicle sales have grown at a compound annual rate of close to 78% over the last five years, and the sector is expected to be worth around 118 billion dollars by 2032.
Within an electric vehicle, the battery is the decisive component: it accounts for 45% to 50% of the vehicle's total cost and largely determines its efficiency, price and service life. The article focuses on so-called advanced chemistry cells (ACC), the term Indian industrial policy uses, in current practice, for lithium-ion batteries, since other chemistries are still at laboratory or pilot stage.
The underlying problem is external dependence. India imports virtually all of its lithium, cobalt, nickel and other critical raw materials, which exposes its industry to price volatility, supply disruptions and geopolitical risk. To reverse this, the Government set a target of producing 50 GWh of ACC batteries and 5 GWh of specialised technologies by 2030, backed by the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme, under which three large companies signed agreements to build gigafactories.
The gap the study aims to fill
The authors argue that previous studies analyse isolated pieces —demand, critical minerals, component manufacturing or policy— but rarely connect them or assess whether domestic cell and component production can realistically meet demand. The work has two objectives: (1) to estimate supply and demand for ACC batteries in the Indian electric vehicle market, and (2) to identify the main challenges and opportunities for cell and component manufacturing in the country.
2. Methodology
Primary and secondary sources
The study combines qualitative and quantitative methods. For primary research, semi-structured interviews were held with around 20 experts —public officials, battery manufacturers, raw material suppliers and research centres— between January and August 2025, together with a structured questionnaire and attendance at more than 20 industry workshops, conferences and round tables, including consultations by the Ministry of Heavy Industries (May 2024) and several summits organised by the India Energy Storage Alliance (IESA) in 2024 and 2025.
The secondary research draws on official documents and studies by NITI Aayog, the Ministry of Heavy Industries, the International Energy Agency, JMK Research, IISD, Customized Energy Solutions (CES), CEEW, IESA and the International Copper Association India, among others.
How demand and supply are projected
Demand is estimated with a bottom-up model. The base year is the 2,019,814 electric vehicles registered in fiscal year 2024 according to the official VAHAN dashboard. Sales in each segment (two-, three- and four-wheelers, buses and light commercial vehicles) are projected to 2030 with specific growth rates and multiplied by the average battery size of each segment, taken from NITI Aayog and CES market studies. Two scenarios are compared: a business-as-usual one (base case) and one with a stronger policy push, reaching a 30% electric sales share in 2030 (best case).
Supply starts from the capacities announced by the PLI gigafactories and by other private players. To avoid confusing installed capacity with actual output, the authors apply a utilisation factor that starts at around 30% and rises to 60% in 2030, in line with international experience that a gigafactory takes two to three years to stabilise. The difference between demand and effective supply gives the gap that must be covered by imports.
3. The ACC battery value chain
Three links
The article describes the chain in three stages: upstream (mining and refining of lithium, cobalt, nickel and other materials), midstream (manufacturing of cathodes, anodes, electrolytes and separators and their assembly into cells) and downstream (integration of cells into packs for vehicles and stationary storage, and recycling at end of life).
Where the value lies
The key figure is that materials and components account for more than 70% of the value of a lithium-ion cell. Anode and cathode active materials, electrolyte and separator alone make up around 50%. In an LFP (lithium iron phosphate) cell, the cathode accounts for about 30% of the cost, the anode 15%, the electrolyte 10% and the separator 7%; the remaining 23% corresponds to current collectors, binders, casing, thermal and safety components and manufacturing overheads. The conclusion is straightforward: assembling cells from imported components leaves most of the value outside the country, so localising materials is essential.
4. The public policy framework
National programmes
The article reviews the Indian Government's main instruments:
- FAME India (since 2015): incentives for buying electric and hybrid vehicles and for charging infrastructure, rolled out in two phases.
- PLI for ACC cells: a 50 GWh target, with minimum domestic value addition starting at 25% and reaching 60% within five years, and allocations of 5 to 20 GWh per company. In March 2022 Rajesh Exports, Hyundai Global Motors, Ola Electric and Reliance New Energy were selected; in July 2022 Reliance, Ola and Rajesh Exports signed.
- PLI for the automotive sector, approved in 2021 for advanced technology products over the period 2022-23 to 2026-27.
- National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM), the "Champion OEM" and "Champion Component" schemes, and the MAHA-EV mission of the Anusandhan National Research Foundation, plus auctions of strategic minerals and the acquisition of mining assets abroad, such as the lithium blocks in Catamarca (Argentina).
Competition between states
Indian states have added their own incentives: capital subsidies, tax exemptions, land allocation and favourable electricity prices. Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Odisha offer the most complete package, while Maharashtra, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh and Haryana provide partial support. Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Telangana have become industry hubs, home to companies such as Reliance, Ola Electric, Exide, Amara Raja, Lucas TVS, Mahindra, L&T, Toshiba, Agratas and Waaree Energy, and the destination of component makers such as Epsilon Advanced Materials, ALTMIN and GFL.
5. Cell demand and supply to 2030
Demand multiplies
Starting from around 9 GWh in 2023, annual demand for ACC batteries would reach 17 GWh (base case) or 20 GWh (best case) in 2025, 52 or 78 GWh in 2028, and between 100 and 197 GWh in 2030. The biggest jump is concentrated in the last years of the decade.
Which chemistries will dominate
The two mature technologies are LFP and NMC (nickel manganese cobalt). For 2030 the authors expect a split of roughly 70% LFP, 25% NMC and 5% other chemistries (sodium-ion, LMFP, solid state). LFP wins on cost, safety and thermal stability, helped by the rise of battery swapping in three-wheeler and commercial vehicle fleets. NMC, with higher energy density, is left to the premium segments.
Manufacturing capacity
Three companies have signed the PLI for 40 GWh and more than ten have announced gigafactories outside the scheme. According to IESA, cumulative installed capacity could rise from 1 GWh in 2024 to 142 GWh in 2030, of which around 85 GWh would be operational by then. The PLI would contribute 50 GWh and the rest would come from players such as Amara Raja, Exide, Lucas TVS and JSW. The article warns, however, that falling global cell prices have delayed investments and commissioning, and that some PLI beneficiaries have requested extensions or face penalties for non-compliance.
The gap and import dependence
The result is that India will keep importing most of its cells for several years. In 2025, against demand of about 17 GWh, domestic production would be around 2 GWh, so close to 90% would be covered by imports, mainly from China. The shift would come from 2028 onwards:
| Year | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Demand covered by imports (base case) | ≈90% | ≈87% | ≈76% | 57% | 36% | 15% |
Source: Verma, Sikarwar and Dasgupta (2026).
In 2030, with about 85 GWh produced domestically against about 100 GWh of demand in the base case, the country would cover most of its needs. There is an internal tension in the article worth noting: in their conclusions the authors state that in 2030 domestic production (≈85.5 GWh) will cover less than half of a demand of ≈185 GWh, a figure close to the optimistic scenario. The reasonable reading is that self-sufficiency only comes within reach if demand follows the base case; if adoption accelerates, dependence will remain high.
Sensitivity analysis
The authors cross three adoption levels (10% below the base case, base case and 10% above) with utilisation factors of 30%, 50% and 70%. The resulting gap is:
| Scenario | 2024 | 2027 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Low adoption, low utilisation | 11 GWh | 28 GWh | 39 GWh |
| Base case | 12 GWh | 28 GWh | 15 GWh |
| High adoption, high utilisation | 13 GWh | 28 GWh | −9 GWh (surplus) |
Source: Verma, Sikarwar and Dasgupta (2026).
The conclusion matters for industrial policy: factory utilisation weighs more on the long-term balance than the pace of adoption. Getting plants to produce efficiently matters more than selling more cars.
6. Components: where it is going well and where it is not
Indian manufacturers have announced capacities for 2025-2030 of around 300,000 tonnes a year of anode, 250,000 of LFP cathode, 70,000 of NMC cathode, 12,000 of electrolyte and 40,000 of aluminium foil. According to IESA, the planned active material capacity is enough to supply the 50 GWh of the PLI. More than fifteen companies have launched component gigafactory projects, including Epsilon, Himadri, Tirupati Graphite, PCBL and HEG (anodes); ALTMIN, Manikaran, Neogen, BASF and Lohum (cathodes); Gujarat Fluorochemicals, Navin Fluorine and Anupam Rasayan (electrolytes); Jindal Films, UFLEX and Rahil (separators); and Hindalco (foils).
The picture is uneven:
- LFP cathode: supply exceeds demand throughout the period (56 to 140 kilotonnes against demand of 26 to 132 kt).
- Anode: a large surplus (60 to 212 kt against 14 to 70 kt), which opens the door to exports if quality and price are competitive.
- Electrolyte and separator: still in deficit, requiring investment, public support and technology partnerships.
Component makers are calling for a PLI-type scheme of their own, since the current one rewards cell assembly but not materials processing.
7. India versus China, the EU and the United States
The international comparison places India at an early but accelerating stage:
- China dominates thanks to a fully integrated ecosystem, lower capital and operating costs, industrial electricity at around 0.08–0.10 USD/kWh and lead times of about two years from announcement to production.
- The European Union has announced hundreds of GWh, but many projects suffer delays or cancellations because of high energy (0.18–0.38 €/kWh) and labour costs and regulatory complexity; lead times range from two to more than five years.
- The United States has accelerated since the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), with more than 1,000 GWh announced in North America for 2030 and lead times of two to three years.
- India has an estimated investment cost of 120 million USD per GWh, above the 80–110 million range typical in China; cheap labour, but relatively high industrial electricity tariffs (around 0.055–0.11 €/kWh) and more than three years from announcement to production.
For the authors, China is the most competitive, the US and the EU are advancing on the back of public support, and India is at a point where fast, well-targeted interventions can make the difference.
8. The challenges of domestic manufacturing
Raw materials
This is the most serious problem. India is 100% dependent on imports of high-purity lithium, cobalt and nickel, electrolyte precursors and separator materials. For NMC batteries it imports nickel sulphate, cobalt sulphate and lithium carbonate from China, Australia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and its cobalt refining capacity is limited. Graphite is a striking case: although the country holds around 8% of global reserves, it does not produce battery-grade natural graphite because of mining and environmental restrictions. Synthetic graphite, made from coal tar pitch, could fall short and force imports of petroleum coke.
Manufacturing and costs
Many announced investments are moving slowly because of the difficulty of financing highly capital-intensive plants. The chain is fragmented: manufacturers buy from numerous foreign suppliers, with long lead times and extra logistics costs. In addition, Indian industrial electricity is expensive compared with China's, where subsidies lower the bill.
Skilled workforce
Making batteries requires expertise in electrochemistry, materials science, precision engineering and automation. India lacks a talent base in electrode preparation, electrolyte formulation, cell assembly, battery management system (BMS) integration and quality control, something China, South Korea, Japan and the EU have spent decades building.
Policy and regulatory gaps
There is no specific programme for component manufacturing; the PLI supports cells, not raw material processing. On top of this come slow environmental permits, limited access to bank credit, land acquisition problems, tariff complexity and customs bottlenecks.
Adverse global regulation
The international environment penalises Indian industry. The US IRA limits tax credits to batteries made in the US or in countries with a free trade agreement, which leaves India out; in addition, Indian battery exports face tariffs of around 25%. The EU Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) requires at least 40% of battery materials to be processed in the EU or in trusted partners, a threshold India does not meet today. And China restricts exports of graphite, gallium and germanium while controlling more than 65% of global graphite processing and around 70% of LFP cathode capacity.
9. Opportunities and proposals
Securing raw materials
Sign bilateral agreements with the United States, Australia and Chile for preferential access to lithium, nickel and cobalt; extend the PLI to component makers; pass an Indian critical raw materials act that attracts foreign investment in mining and processing; set up materials validation laboratories; and reserve strategic resources such as coal tar for the battery industry.
Lowering the cost of capital
A comprehensive framework of subsidies for land, machinery and conversion costs, with exemptions from stamp duty and tariffs on specialised equipment, together with government-to-government agreements with Japan and South Korea to transfer technology for copper foil, separators and electrolytes.
Financial and regulatory support
A single window for land, environmental permits and infrastructure; low-interest credit lines, guarantees and risk-sharing mechanisms —banks are reluctant to lend without long-term offtake contracts—; and well-calibrated anti-dumping or safeguard duties.
R&D, innovation and talent
The authors propose centres of excellence with the IITs, NITs and national laboratories, prototyping centres to move from lab to industry, and specific training at ITIs and universities. Indian research is already working on solid state, sodium-ion, LMFP cathodes, lithium-sulphur, zinc-air and flow batteries, although almost all of it sits between technology readiness levels (TRL) 3 and 7. Highlights include Macsen's sodium-ion pilot line planned for 2026, graphite anode investments by Epsilon (9 billion rupees) and HEG (around 1 billion euros), NTPC's 100 MWh vanadium flow battery project, and recycling, the most mature technology (TRL 8-9), with companies such as Lohum, Attero and Rubamin operating commercially under the extended producer responsibility regime.
Energy, visas and domestic demand
- Energy: a subsidised tariff of around 0.032 €/kWh for intensive processes such as graphitisation, six-month banking of renewables, and green industrial zones with fast-track permits.
- Visas: longer, cheaper, multi-assignment visas for the foreign technicians who commission the plants.
- Demand: strengthen FAME and cut India's GST on domestic cells from 18% to 5%, as well as requiring local content in public procurement of vehicles and storage.
Adapting to international trade
India should join the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), negotiate critical minerals memoranda with the US, the EU, Australia and Chile, and seek mutual recognition of its technical standards (BIS) with the EU and Japan. To comply with the CRMA and European requirements, it will need pilot refining plants, independent traceability and carbon intensity reporting systems, and to prepare for the mandatory recycled content shares that will tighten between 2027 and 2030. With regard to China, it proposes diversifying imports, building strategic reserves and scaling up recycling.
10. Roadmap by time horizon
The article summarises its proposals in a roadmap with three horizons (table 7 of the original):
| Horizon | Main measures |
|---|---|
| Short term (1–2 years) | Trade agreements with the US, Australia and Chile; validation laboratories; capital subsidies and tariff exemptions on equipment; single window; centres of excellence; subsidised electricity tariff; visa reform; 5% GST; joining the MSP. |
| Medium term (2–5 years) | PLI for components; critical raw materials act; pilot refining plants; green industrial zones; cooperation with Japan and Korea; anti-dumping where appropriate; R&D in solid state, sodium-ion and recycling; local content in public procurement; mineral reserves. |
| Long term (more than 5 years) | Integrated refining hubs; domestic mining of lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite and rare earths; cost parity with the major hubs; net-zero industrial clusters; home-grown talent; leadership in next-generation chemistries. |
Source: Verma, Sikarwar and Dasgupta (2026).
11. Conclusions
The PLI scheme has given a real boost to cell manufacturing, but the study makes clear that assembling cells is not enough: the value lies in the materials, and there India still depends almost entirely on other countries. In its favour, the country has a fast-growing domestic market, the momentum of renewables, an active industrial policy and an emerging capacity in anodes and LFP cathodes that could even generate exportable surpluses. Against it weigh access to minerals, the high cost of capital and energy, the shortage of skilled technicians, the lack of support for components and an increasingly protectionist international trade environment.
The authors recommend a phased strategy combining preferential trade agreements, domestic refining and recycling, tax and capital incentives, technology partnerships with Japan, South Korea and the United States, training, R&D and demand-side measures. If applied, India could close the gap between supply and demand and become a competitive hub for battery technologies.
Limitations of the study
The authors themselves acknowledge that the analysis does not cover the environmental dimension of the chain; they announce future work with life cycle assessment (CO₂ avoided per localised GWh, recycling recovery rates and a comparison between primary mining and recycling). One further caveat should be added: two of the three authors work for Customized Energy Solutions, whose reports are a main source for the projections (the article declares this conflict of interest and states that the company was not involved in the study).
Source
Verma, B., Sikarwar, S. and Dasgupta, S. (2026). Policy and market analysis of India's EV battery supply chain.